3 links tagged with all of: security + formal verification
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Google DeepMind used a multi-agent AI system called AlphaProof Code to mathematically prove security properties of the actual compiled code behind Signal's encryption protocol, a task that usually takes expert teams years. The whole verification took four weeks, with humans reviewing only about one percent of the generated proofs.
- Formal proofs were generated for the real Signal implementation, not just its design, covering over six million lines of Lean code.
- The system was tested by reintroducing two previously fixed bugs, and in both cases it produced a machine-checked proof that the buggy version was insecure.
- Human experts only needed to review about one percent of the codebase, since Lean automatically checks the rest.
@AnthropicAI on X
Anthropic's Frontier Red Team used Claude to formally verify security properties across more than a hundred open-source libraries in a few weeks, work that previously needed small codebases or a lot of expert time. The effort was done with Theorem Labs.
- Formal verification can prove code is free of certain bugs, but until now it has mostly been practical only for small codebases or projects with heavy expert involvement.
- Claude proved security properties in over one hundred real-world open-source libraries over a span of a few weeks.
- The work was a collaboration with Theorem Labs, and the full research is published on Anthropic's site.
AWS introduced the Nitro Isolation Engine on its new M9g and M9gd Graviton5 instances and used Isabelle/HOL to prove that it enforces strict VM isolation. They modeled the engine in a subset of Rust (μRust), wrote Separation Logic specifications, and proved functional correctness, memory safety, and noninterference to guarantee confidentiality and integrity.
- AWS deployed a formally verified hypervisor component (Nitro Isolation Engine) into production commercial cloud infrastructure for the first time, on new M9g/M9gd Graviton5 instances.
- They produced 330,000 lines of machine-checked Isabelle/HOL proofs, matching seL4's verification scale, covering functional correctness, memory safety, and noninterference.
- The proof approach modeled the engine in a custom μRust subset (no traits/dynamic dispatch) with Separation Logic specs and a weakest-precondition calculus via their open-source AutoCorrode library.
- Every guest-state-touching operation must pass through this engine, which checks requests against the formal spec to mathematically guarantee VM confidentiality and integrity.